One scope grammar. Three clouds. Zero permission sprawl.

Where Multi-Cloud IAM breaks today

Permission sprawl across clouds

The average enterprise has accumulated thousands of unused or excessive role assignments across AWS, GCP, and Azure.

91% — of enterprises run multi-cloud · Flexera, 2024

Privilege-escalation toxic combos

iam:CreateRole + iam:PassRole, or iam:CreatePolicyVersion + iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion, are well-known escalation paths still routinely granted.

5 — average IAM tools per enterprise · Gartner

Vendor offboarding gaps

Departed contractors retain credentials in cloud providers that the enterprise's HR system never reaches.

SOC 2 CC6.3 — requires logical access removal at termination

Three patents, deployed against this industry's threat model

Each of Axowl's three filed patents maps to a specific structural failure mode in Multi-Cloud IAM. Together they form a single, end-to-end defense.

Hierarchical Distributed Trust Fabric — Workstation (L1) · Org IAM (L2) · Multi-cloud federation (L3)

Each workstation carries a PUF-bound identity (L1). The organization's IAM service serves as L2. The federation across AWS, GCP, Azure, SAP, Salesforce, and Okta forms L3. A single scope grammar — namespace.resource.action:key=value — propagates as a sealed snapshot to every connected app within seconds.

Transition-Sealed Integrity System — Every assignment, every revocation, sealed

Each role assignment, just-in-time grant, escalation, and revocation is sealed in real time. Vendor offboarding becomes a sealed and verifiable event. Quarterly access reviews become a query against a tamper-evident chain, replacing days of spreadsheet reconciliation.

Pre-grant LLM Conflict Verification — Toxic IAM combinations refused at grant time

Known escalation patterns (iam:CreateRole + iam:PassRole, full read on prod + write on prod-replica) are refused by the LLM gate before the grant lands. Custom policy classes can be added — the gate learns the firm's specific definition of conflict.

Deployment that fits the threat model

Most multi-cloud IAM workloads start at the General tier (FIDO2, software seal). Compliance-driven deployments (SOC 2, ISO 27001) move to the Standard tier (vTPM) for audit-grade sealing.

Recommended tier: T0 · General → T1 · Standard

Deployment path: vTPM · BYOA supported

Operational detail: Day-1 deployment on vTPM with BYOA (Bring Your Own AWS) supported. Connectors ship for AWS IAM, GCP IAM, Azure RBAC, SAP, Salesforce, Okta, Entra ID, and SCIM.

Three concrete deployments

Cross-cloud permission unification

A finance lead's role spans SAP modules, GCP BigQuery datasets, and AWS S3 buckets through a single scope DSL — issued once, propagated everywhere, sealed centrally.

DevOps just-in-time access

Production access is a sealed JIT grant tied to a ticket. Auto-revocation at ticket close is itself sealed; auditors see exactly who held what, when.

Vendor offboarding

A single sealed revocation propagates across every connected cloud and SaaS within seconds. Departed contractor access becomes structurally impossible.

Versus what's deployed today

Today — Per-cloud IAM + spreadsheet review

Each cloud uses a different DSL, different audit format, different review cadence. Toxic combinations cross cloud boundaries and escape per-cloud review.

With DPSM — Axowl DPSM

One scope grammar spans every cloud. The pre-grant LLM gate sees combinations across clouds. Sealed audit covers every assignment in a single chain.

Standards & regulatory frameworks aligned

• SOC 2 Type II (CC6, CC7)
• ISO 27001 / 27002
• NIST 800-53 AC family
• CIS Cloud Benchmarks
• GDPR Article 32
• HIPAA Security Rule (with Healthcare deployment)