Sovereign integrity for every flight, every sensor, every command.

Where Aerospace & Defense breaks today

Telemetry spoofing & GPS denial

Unsigned sensor streams can be replayed or substituted in flight, leading flight controllers to act on fabricated data.

$10B+ — annual GNSS-spoofing damage estimate · GPS World, 2024

Unauthorized override channels

Vendor maintenance backdoors and admin bypass paths remain a leading vector for kinetic compromise of avionics.

78% — of avionics CVEs traced to bypass paths · GAO, 2023

Supply-chain firmware tampering

OTA updates from tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers reach the airframe with limited cryptographic provenance.

ITAR · DFARS — controls now require tamper-evident logs end-to-end

Three patents, deployed against this industry's threat model

Each of Axowl's three filed patents maps to a specific structural failure mode in Aerospace & Defense. Together they form a single, end-to-end defense.

Hierarchical Distributed Trust Fabric — Sensor (L1) · Avionics (L2) · Ground + Satellite (L3) quorum

PUF-derived identities are embedded in each sensor (L1), echoed by the avionics computer (L2), and reconciled with the ground station and a redundant satellite link (L3). Loss or capture of any single subsystem does not expose the system key — kinetic actions require k-of-n agreement across tiers, so a compromised line-replaceable unit cannot, by itself, execute a release.

Transition-Sealed Integrity System — Black-box-grade sealing of every control transition

Every flight-control deflection, weapons-release authorization, and telemetry frame is sealed at the moment it crosses a state boundary. The hash chain preserves both the time and the actor; investigators can reconstruct the precise sequence of events with cryptographic certainty, even when the airframe is recovered weeks later.

Pre-grant LLM Conflict Verification — Pre-grant blocking of conflicting flight authorities

Before a permission such as "ground crew + weapons hot" or "co-pilot + autopilot override in restricted airspace" is granted, the LLM gate detects the semantic conflict and refuses the grant itself. The unsafe combination never reaches the cockpit, eliminating an entire class of insider and procedural risk.

Deployment that fits the threat model

Mission criticality and regulatory exposure (DFARS, ITAR, CMMC 2.0) push aerospace deployments to the Iron tier — hardware-only, FPGA PUF, with custom ASIC integration on the production glide path.

Recommended tier: T3 · Iron

Deployment path: AWS F2 (FPGA) → MPW prototype → ASIC mass production

Operational detail: Initial integration runs on AWS F2 within 72 hours for ground systems and simulator hardware. Airborne hardware moves to MPW prototype on 8-inch wafer, then to commercial mass production via Korean foundry partnerships (DB HiTek HV BCD for harsh environments).

Three concrete deployments

UAV swarm command authority

Each airframe carries a PUF-bound identity. A spoofed drone cannot join the swarm because it cannot produce a valid k-of-n signature; rogue commands are dropped at the radio layer.

Satellite firmware OTA

Updates are sealed by the manufacturer's L1 device and re-sealed at L2 ground stations. The satellite refuses to boot any image whose chain does not terminate at the original PUF root.

Black-box reconstruction

Post-incident, every actuator command and every authorization is reconstructible with cryptographic timestamps, replacing weeks of forensic interpretation with a deterministic timeline.

Versus what's deployed today

Today — Traditional avionics signing

Centralized signing keys held by ground operators; firmware updates rely on supplier honesty. A single key extraction compromises an entire fleet.

With DPSM — Axowl DPSM

PUF keys never leave silicon. Even Axowl staff cannot extract them. Per-airframe, per-sensor identity makes fleet-wide compromise mathematically impossible.

Standards & regulatory frameworks aligned

• DFARS 252.204-7012
• NIST 800-171
• CMMC 2.0
• ITAR EAR99
• FIPS 140-2 L3 (planned)
• DO-326A / ED-202A