Compliance · Cryptographic modules
The standards a cryptographic module answers to, and how Roost meets them
FIPS 140-3, KCMVP, JCMVP and the EU Cyber Resilience Act decide whether a signing device can be bought by a government, a bank or a hospital. Here is what each one asks for, who relies on it, and how Roost answers in hardware.
See Roost Talk to us about deployment
Stored keys. Roost regenerates its key from the chip itself (PUF) at every power-up
2-of-3
Quorum of FPGAs from three different manufacturers, watched by a separate monitor
Sides of the enclosure covered by a detection mesh that erases secrets the moment it is breached
Frameworks covered: FIPS 140-3, KCMVP, JCMVP and the EU CRA
The four frameworks
What each standard is, and who relies on it
Three of them share one technical core, ISO/IEC 19790. The fourth, the CRA, is a product law that applies to anything with software or firmware sold in the EU.
United States · Canada
FIPS 140-3
Federal Information Processing Standard 140-3 sets the security requirements for cryptographic modules. NIST published it in 2019, and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), run jointly by NIST and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, validates modules against it. It adopts ISO/IEC 19790:2012 and its test requirements, ISO/IEC 24759, and grades modules on four security levels.
Who relies on it
US and Canadian federal agencies must protect sensitive data with validated modules, and FedRAMP and FISMA programs inherit that rule. Banks, insurers, healthcare and defense suppliers worldwide use it as the practical benchmark when they buy hardware security.
Republic of Korea
KCMVP
The Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program checks that a module implements approved algorithms correctly and protects its keys. The National Intelligence Service sets the policy, the National Security Research Institute (NSR) validates, and designated labs such as KISA carry out testing. Requirements follow KS X ISO/IEC 19790 , and the approved algorithms include Korean standards such as ARIA, SEED and LEA.
Who relies on it
National and public institutions in Korea must use a validated module when they encrypt important data on their networks, and the requirement appears in public procurement. Financial and critical infrastructure operators follow it as well.
Japan
JCMVP
The Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program (JCMVP, 暗号モジュール試験及び認証制度) is operated by the Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA). Third-party labs test modules against ISO/IEC 19790:2012 and ISO/IEC 24759:2017, the same core FIPS 140-3 uses, and IPA also issues certificates for cryptographic algorithm implementations.
Who relies on it
Japanese government agencies and their suppliers reference JCMVP in security standards for procurement. Since April 2024, IPA has paused new module validation applications and continues to accept algorithm verification, according to its public notice.
European Union
EU Cyber Resilience Act
The Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 , sets cybersecurity duties for products with digital elements sold in the EU, hardware and software alike. Products must be secure by design and by default, ship without known exploitable vulnerabilities, receive security updates over their support period, and carry a software bill of materials and CE marking.
Who relies on it
Every manufacturer, importer and distributor placing such products on the EU market. Reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents applies from 11 September 2026, and the remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027.
FIPS 140-3 security levels
Four levels, and what changes at 3 and 4
The difference between levels is mostly physical: how a module notices an attack on its body, and what it does with its secrets when it does.
Level 1
Production-grade components and at least one approved algorithm. No specific physical protection is required.
Level 2
Tamper evidence. Seals, coatings or pick-resistant covers show that someone has opened the module, and operators authenticate by role.
Level 3
Tamper detection and response. Opening a cover or door triggers immediate zeroization of secrets, a hard coating resists probing, and operators authenticate by identity.
Level 4
A complete envelope of protection. A detection mesh catches penetration from any direction and erases secrets at once. Temperature and voltage outside the normal range are detected and answered as an attack, and operators use multi-factor authentication.
A summary of the physical security requirements in FIPS 140-3 and ISO/IEC 19790. Each level also sets requirements for authentication, self-tests and lifecycle.
How Roost complies
Each design choice answers a specific requirement
Roost is built to the physical security requirements of FIPS 140-3 Level 4, and to the KCMVP, JCMVP and CRA requirements alongside them.
Roost design
Keyless: the key comes from the chip
A physical unclonable function (PUF) recreates the signing key from microscopic variations in the silicon each time Roost powers up. No key is written to flash or any other storage, and the working copy is erased when power drops.
Requirement it meets
Protection and zeroization of critical security parameters
FIPS 140-3 and ISO/IEC 19790 require that secret keys cannot be extracted and are zeroized on demand. With nothing stored, a powered-off Roost holds no key at all.
Roost design
2-of-3 quorum across three chip makers
Three FPGAs from AMD, Microchip and Lattice each sign, and a signature is valid only when two of them agree. A separate monitor checks the voters and stops the device when they disagree or fail a self-test.
Requirement it meets
Self-tests, error states and integrity of output
The standards require a module to test itself and to stop producing output when an error occurs. A flaw or hidden function in one manufacturer's chip cannot produce a valid signature alone.
Roost design
Sealed enclosure with a six-sided detection mesh
The voters sit inside an enclosure wrapped on all six sides by a detection mesh. Cutting, drilling or opening it from any direction erases the secrets immediately.
Requirement it meets
Physical security, Level 4 envelope
Level 4 asks for a complete envelope that detects penetration from any direction and zeroizes at once, beyond the seals of Level 2 and the door switches of Level 3.
Roost design
Temperature and voltage guard, conduction cooling
Sensors watch temperature and supply voltage. Values outside the operating range are treated as an attack and the secrets are erased. Heat leaves through conduction rather than fan openings, so the enclosure stays closed.
Requirement it meets
Environmental failure protection
At Level 4 a module must withstand or respond to conditions outside its normal operating range, so that freezing or overvolting the chip cannot be used to pull secrets out.
Roost design
One ISO/IEC 19790 core, approved algorithms per scheme
Roost follows the ISO/IEC 19790 requirements shared by FIPS 140-3, KCMVP and JCMVP, and takes its algorithms from each scheme's approved list, such as SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256, which appear on the FIPS 140-3 and KCMVP lists alike.
Requirement it meets
Approved algorithms and validation in each country
Each validation program checks that only approved algorithms are used and that they are implemented correctly. One design built on a shared core maps to all three programs.
Roost design
Closed-network and on-premise deployment
Roost runs inside the customer's own building or air-gapped network, or in a dedicated rack in Axowl's colocation. Firmware updates are signed, and every component is listed in a software bill of materials.
Requirement it meets
Public-sector deployment and CRA product duties
KCMVP-bound institutions often require keys to stay inside their own network. The CRA requires secure updates, a bill of materials and vulnerability handling for the product's support period.
Why Roost
Why Roost is the strongest choice for regulated signing
Each reason comes from a design decision above, not from a claim about anyone else's product.
Nothing stored to steal
The key does not exist while the power is off. Stealing the device, imaging its memory or desoldering its storage yields no key.
No single chip maker to trust
A valid signature needs agreement between silicon from two different manufacturers, so trust does not rest on any one supply chain.
Protection built for the top level
The physical design follows Level 4: a full detection envelope with immediate erasure, rather than seals that only show an attack afterwards.
One design, four frameworks
Because FIPS 140-3, KCMVP and JCMVP share ISO/IEC 19790, a single Roost design serves the United States, Canada, Korea and Japan, with the CRA covering the EU.
It runs where your data lives
Closed networks, on-premise racks and dedicated colocation are all supported, so keys never have to cross into someone else's cloud.
Open to evaluation
This page lists the requirement each design choice answers, so evaluators and procurement teams can map Roost to their checklist directly.
Roost is designed and built to the requirements above. Certification scope and timing for your deployment are covered during consultation.
Bring a cryptographic module your auditors will recognize
Tell us your sector, country and network setup, and we will map Roost to the frameworks you answer to.
See Roost Talk to us about deployment